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et al.: South Carolina Bar Association Annual Business Meeting

SOUTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING
Held at Fort Sumter Hotel, Charleston, S. C.
May 5th and 6th, 1949
GENERAL MINUTES
Thursday, May 5, 1949
The fifty-fifth annual meeting of the South Carolina Bar
Association convened in the City of Charleston, South Carolina, at 3 o'clock P.M., Thursday, May 5, 1949, with the President, Honorable George W. Warren of Hampton, presiding.
Some two hundred and twenty-five members of the Association were present.
After presenting to the meeting distinguished guests
which included all of our judges in attendance and after
appropriate prefacing, remarks, the President delivered his
annual address as follows:
Members of the South Carolina Bar Association:

We are told that one of the studies required by the new twelfth grado
in our public school system is Aesthetic Appreciation. In coming to thin
beautiful old city at this time of year, the lawyers of South Carolina
do not need to have taken that twelfth grade subject to fully understand. the satisfying emotions of Charleston's aesthetic surroundings.
Therefore, at this first opportunity, I wish to express to Charleston
our delight in being here and our thanks for the cordial reception the
city has given us.
Annually the President of the United States delivers his "State
of the Union" address, and the Governor of the State delivers his
yearly review of needful legislation. It is our custom for our President
to make an address to the members of this Association.
It is a pleasure for me to report to you that the lawyers of thin
State, on the whole, have maintained the high ideals of our profession
and that the state of the Bar is good. We can truthfully boast that
no other profession or business can -compare with the Bar of this state
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in exemplary conduct and the maintenance of ethical standards. While
no formal complaints have been filed with the Association, there has
b3een severe criticism of the professional conduct of a very few lawyers. The continued preservation of the high standards of the Bar of
South Carolina demands that our officials and committees be vigilant
in investigating and reporting any breach of ethics or other conduct
-unbecoming of a lawyer. In most instances the punishment of condem-nation by a wholesome public opinion will suffice; but we cannot afford
-to let up in any instance where dishonesty or ethical breaches are
involved. I commend vigilance to the Committee on Grievances.
The law building at the University is well on. its way to being an
accomplished fact. Most of you know what this means to the Dean
and faculty and students--truly a dream come true. We would not be
-true to our trust unless we expressed our appreciation to the University
authorities, Dean Prince, and the General Assembly for this building
and the good work done.
The establishment at the State A & M College at Oiangeburg of
a law school for negroes fills a need and a necessity if we would
Tmaintain our traditional separation of the races.
The inauguration of cooperation between the University of South
4Carolina and the Bar Association with respect to the publication of
the LAw QuARTERLY was commendable and merits our whole-hearted
support. Not only does it afford a vehicle for expression of current
legal research, but it also furnishes a medium for the permanent
preservation of historical legal information.
I report that no progress has been made in this state with the
integration of the bar. During the past year the word "integration".
has come to acquire a rather unwholesome meaning to most Southerners-and not wholly without cause. Considerable opposition to bar
integration developed here. Perhaps, your present president was not
sufficiently sold on the idea to actively undertake the program during
his tenure; at least, I will assume responsibility for not actively advocating its establishment at this time.
The Vice-President of your Association has evolved plans for extensive reforms during the coming year. Commendably, he has advocated that this meeting give consideration to many of these things
at this time. The idea came to me that perhaps instead of "scattering
our shot", so to speak, we should concentrate our efforts here to two
things; and in that way we can at least accomplish that much now.
The themes selected for our direct attention are:
First, the inauguration in South Carolina of a system of Judicial Conferences; and
Second, the establishment in our state Courts of pre-trial conferences.
With respect to these, let me say that opinion about both of these
propositions is by no means unanimous. Even some of our Judges may
dissent about the holding of pretrial conferences; but on an overall
view, I believe the overwhelming sentiment of Bench and Bar is for
both Judicial and Pre-trial Conferences.
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The situation in South Carolina now is such that the Judicial Conferences may be inaugurated without further legislation by the general
convention plan which the Supreme Court through Chief Justice Baker
has adopted. As you know, the Judges of the Circuit Courts and
Justices of the Supreme Court meet tomorrow in Charleston in convention, and it is expected that rules revisions may be made here providing a-Judicial conference plan. Legislative action respecting compensation for expenses may be necessary, and if so, the lawyers should
contact their respective legislators about support of the plan.
Judicial Conferences, we are sure, offer great potential benefits
to the Judges and to a more equal or balanced administration of justice.
Rather than burden the membership with a lengthy discussion of this
particular subject, I have taken the liberty of presenting as a part
of my "State of the Bar" address a speaker well qualified to speak upon
this subject. This will be done at the close of this discourse.
Similarly, the subject of Pre-trial Conferences has been dealt with.
All of us know how work in the Federal Courts has been expedited by the
pre-trial work. Our approach to the matter has been cautious to the
extent of being no approach at all. Fortunately, the Chairman of one
of our committees has given very diligent and careful consideration to
it, and as another part of my address I have asked him to make
presentation of that matter to you.
So, today and tomorrow our theme shall be "Judicial Conferences and
Pre-trial Conferences for South Carolina". May our efforts prove
fruitful. You have my unbounded endorsement of both.
On assumption of my duties as President last year in Columbia,
I stated that many honors had been bestowed upon me in the past and
all of them have been appreciated. Today, I adopt an elaboration of
the idea then expressed, by telling you in fact and in truth that no
honor that I have ever received has met with my deep appreciation more
than to be selected as President of the South Carolina Bar Association.
It will be prized so long as I live, and when I come to die, no better
epitaph could be written to my memory than to say he was President
of the Bar of his native State.

Following his address the President called upon Honorable
G. Dewey Oxner, Associate Justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court, for a special report on the matter of Judicial
Conferences.
JUSTICE OXNER:
When I was honored in 1944 by being asked to make a few remarks
to this Association, I undertook to make certain suggestions which r
thought might aid in the administration of Justice. Among them was
that we adopt in South Carolina a Judicial Council or a Judicial Conference. I am still convinced that this experiment would be worth trying
and might prove a valuable addition to our Judicial machinery.
A Judicial Council is an organization set up to study and make suggestions and recommendations for improvement of the State Judicial
system. Primarily it is a research organization and has no power to

Published by Scholar Commons, 1949

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 4 [1949], Art. 3
313

BAR AssoCIATION TRANSACTIONS

put its recommendations into effect. Its purpose is to study the operation of the courts and from time to time recommend changes. Such an
a gap in our Judicial system. Some means should be
organization fills
provided for a periodic examination of our rules of court and code of
procedure. We can hardly expect the Legislature to do this. The members of that body are already devoting more time to their work than
can be spared. Usually they are engrossed in problems that are urgent
and pressing in the State or the Counties they represent. They do not
have the opportunity of doing the necessary research in order to determine what changes, if any, should be made. Neither under our present
set up could we reasonably expect this job to be done by the Judiciary.
One distinguished professor said, "the Judiciary is the element which
conserves; it does not create." I doubt if this statement does full credit
to the Judiciary. It is true that those of us on the Bench belong to a
rather non-competitive organization and do not worry much about our
own defects or try very hard to improve our methods. Our natural inclination is to follow precedent and our primary purpose is to administer
the law, using the methods to which we are accustomed. But after all,
those of us on the Bench do not have the necessary time to devote to the
task and are, also, rather reluctant to voluntarily undertake it.
As far back as 1921 Judge Cardozo said: "The duty must be cast on
some man or group of men to watch the law in action, observe the
manner of its functioning and report the changes needed when the function is deranged." He was not advancing a new idea even at that time.
It had already been recognized in England that there must be some
body or institution clothed with the responsibility of -surveying the
Judicial system.
The first Judicial Council-was created in Ohio in 1923 and was
quickly followed by the establishment of a similar institution by Massachusetts in 1924. Now approximately 35 states have either Judicial
Councils or Judicial Conferences and a number of others have the mat.
ter under consideration. The composition of these bodies varies widely.
In a few states only the Judges participate, in probably most of them
both Judges and lawyers, while a few also contain professors of Law,
representatives from the Legislature and laymen.
There has been a somewhat similar development in the Federal
Judicial system. In 1922 a Federal statute was enacted providing for
an annual conference of the Senior Circuit Judges to be called and presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
The result was most satisfactory. There was then suggested the desirability of similar meetings within the individual circuits. This was done
and in this circuit a meeting, which has been quite outstanding, is held
each year in Asheville. The members of the Bar are asked to participate.
The exchange of views and discussion of problems has been found to
be quite helpful.
The success of any such organization, of course, depends largely
upon the cooperation of the Bench and the Bar. Unless we are genuinely
interested in the subject and willing to devote the necessary time to
it, very little can be accomplished. On the other hand, if we are sold
on the idea, there is much that can be done. I do not mean to suggest
that there is a need in this State for any radical changes. In fact, any
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extreme measures would be quite unwise. It is a subject that can only
be approached after thorough study and any recommendations should
have the mature consideration of both the Bench and the Bar. It is
very probable, however, that after such a study is made, it will develop
that many worthwhile changes are in order. Our code of proceduro
has been in use for approximately 75 years without many substantial
changes. The fact that in almost every other State it has been found
that improvements should be made should at least cause us to hesitate
to say that we are content that nothing should be done.
The set up of these agencies in a number of states is quite elaborate.
In some states there is a paid secretary to do the necessary research.
I doubt if we need any extensive organization in this State. Perhaps
it would be well to begin with an act setting up some simple machinery
wherein the Supreme Court, the Circuit Bench, the County Courts and
the Bar should be represented and also include therein the Chairmen
of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the House. Such an
organization should not be too large because it would become unwieldy.
It could then make recommendations to the entire Bench and Bar for
criticism and suggestions. (Read letter from Hudgins)
We now have a statute which provides that the Chief Justice shall
call the Circuit Judges and the members of the Supreme Court in convention at least once in every two years for the purpose of revising
and amending the rules of the Circuit Court. We can hardly expect
such a convention to serve the purpose which I have undertaken to
outline. In the first place, there should be a small number to make a
thorough study and recommend changes to the whole Bench. In the second place, the Bench needs the assistance of the Bar in these matters.
At present we have no means by which we are enabled to obtain the
criticisms and suggestions from the members of the Bar.

The idea of the establishment of a Judicial Conference in
our State brought forth many approving remarks and the
following resolution was adopted without a dissent:
"BE IT RESOLVED that the Association favors the establishment of a Judicial Conference in South Carolina
and that a Committee of six (6) be appointed by the
President of the Association to study the question and
take the necessary action to set up such an organization. The new President of the Association shall be one
of said committee and shall serve ex-offiaco as Chairman."
Agreeable to the foregoing resolution the President appointed the following committee:
I. A. Smoak
C. T. Graydon
Justice G. Dewey Oxner
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B. Allston Moore of the Charleston Bar was then called
upon to make the report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure. This committee consisted of: Mr. Moore, Chairman, Hugh 0. Hanna, Neville
Holcombe, J.B. Gibson and F. Carlisle Roberts.
MR. MOORE:
The Committee met in Columbia, S. C., on 23 November, 1948, at
the University of South Carolina Law School with the Committee on
Jurisprudence and Law Reform, at which time the two committees Aiscussed the work in their respective fields, to avoid possible conflict, and
then met separately. At that time the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure decided to limit its scope to investigation and report on pre-trial practice and procedure in the state courts.
Judge M. S. Whaley of the University of South Carolina Law School
faculty, wh" met with the committee in Columbia, made an investigation
at the request of the committee on pre-trial practice and procedure in
the twelve states and the District of Columbia, which have adopted and
are now using this procedure; and opinions and comments were also
secured from Deans of Law Schools, Judges and attorneys using the
procedure in other states and members of the Bar in South Carolina.
On completion of this survey, Judge Whaley prepared an article entitled
"Pre-Trial Conferences", which was published in the SOUTH CAROLiNA
LAW QuARTmmy for March, pages 221-230. Shortly thereafter the matter was discussed at a dinner given by the Dean of the Law School,
which was attended by some of the judges of the Supreme Court, Circuit Court judges and a number of members of the South Carolina Bar.
We have studied and considered the information secured by Judge
Whaley in his survey and we recommend to the South Carolina Bar
Association that they urge that pre-trial procedure be adopted in the
Courts of Common Pleas and County Courts in South Carolina. The
committee is mindful of the fact that there are obstacles in making
practical application of pre-trial procedure, but it believes that these
obstacles can be overcome if there is sincere willingness on the part
of the Bar and the judges to utilize the procedure. The committee
feels that the outstanding advantages to be gained by the adoption
of pre-trial procedure would be the strengthening of the trial docket,
conservation of time by agreement as to proof, and providing a forum
which would encourage the settlement of cases.
The greatest difficulty to be encountered in putting the pre-trial
procedure into effect would be in arranging time for the pre-trial conferences. If the procedure is to be of real value in carrying out the
purposes enumerated above, the pre-trial conference should be held not
less than a week or ten days prior to the actual trial of the cause. The
opening of a term of court in any one county may be preceded by a
period of several weeks during which the presiding judge would be
continuously engaged in the trial of cases in other counties of the state
or circuit. The resident judge might also be holding court in another
circuit for some time prior to the opening of a particular term. It is,
therefore, obvious that anything like a full use of pre-trial procedure,
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whether it is to be entrusted to the resident judge or to the presiding
judge, or both, might ultimately involve a rearrangement of the schedule
of terms of court throughout the state; however, it might work out
with practical success without such re-arrangement. The committee is
of the opinion that the advantages to be gained would justify such a
re-arrangement if found to be necessary and that it would be facilitated
by the shortening of trial terms, which would result from an effective
use of pre-trial procedure. Once the trial term begins, the court could
set aside and utilize time for pre-trial conference through the term.
This brought the committee to the question of what judge should
hold the pre-trial conference, the judge assigned to the term or the
resident judge. The committee recommends that the judge assigned to
hold the particular term should conduct the pre-trial conference, leaving
it open for the resident judge, to act should the assigned judge be unable
to do so.
The survey conducted by Judge Whaley clearly indicated that pretrial procedure is most successful in the larger and popular circuits
and that it has not been found of as great advantage in courts where
there is a small amount of litigation; hence, the committee suggests
the use of pre-trial procedure be left to the discretion of the trial judge.
The committee recommends that the following rule be added to the
Circuit Court Rules under authority of Section 34 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for 1942:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear at a designated time before it
for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
The rule which the committee recommends is typical of the Rule of
Court adopted in the eleven states which have inaugurated pre-trial
procedure.

The President advised that the Conference of Judges which
would convene on Friday the 6th of May had this subject for
discussion.
The Secretary and Treasurer of the Association, Walter
S. Montieth, made his report as follows:
REPORT OF SECRETARY-TREASURER

FOR YEAR 1949

Balance 1948 Report ..........................................................
Dues collected through March 31, 1949 ........................

$1,453.02
2,500.00

Total ......................................................................

$3,953.02
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xpenditures:
Reception and Banquet, 1948 ............
.....
.
Orchestra, 1948 Meeting ........
......
President's Luncheon, 1948 Meeting .
.............
Refreshments, 1948 Meeting
....
Ladies Tea, 1948 Meeting .
Flowers for year ......................
Stenographic services ..........
....

Printing for year ..............

.... $1,224.00
175.00
176.76
....

381.30

75.00
42.98
44.10
101.50
39.19
57.10
114.05

.

........

Postage for year .........................................
Delegate to American Bar Association-............
.......
Stationery for year ............
Old bills, 1943 Meeting .................

44.00

........

Salary of Secretary ........................................

600.00

South Carolina Law Quarterly. .....................
........
...
Bank charges for year .

700.00
2.06

Total Expenditures .......

.........

.....

.

3,779.04

..........

$ 173.98

Balance on hand April 1, 1949 .................

The President appointed an auditing committee headed
by L. Marion Gressette to audit the account of the Treasurer
and to report the next day.
The following new members were introduced:
William I. Bouton

.....................

H. C. Bowman ........ .
Saunders M. Bridges

....

D. A. Brockinton, Jr.

...............

W. H. Brockinton .........
Edward D. Buckley ...........

...... Charleston
.Florence

. ...
..........

..

Charleston

................

..

Charleston
...........
. . .................... Charleston
r

W. W. Cabell ....................

George R. F. Cornish, Jr..
Thomas A. Evins ....

.................

Charleston

..........Spartanburg

...

Henry T. Gaud .............
..............................................
Geo. L. Grantham

Charleston

.Easley

W. H. Grimball, Jr. ............................................... Charleston
Charleston
..........
Gerard Hartzog ...................
.............................................. Charleston
L H. Jacobson .

Pinkerssohn Kramer ..........................
Frank A. Lyles ..............
.
DeRosset Meyers ...........
.....
Thomas M. McCrary .........
H. Fletcher Padget, Jr .....................................
Henry R. Richardson .........
Clarence E. Singletary
Frank K. Sloan .-...................---.

Mallory R. Smith .........................
Norman W. Stevenson ................

.
.

..Summerville
....Spartanburg
Charleston
. Charleston
....... Columbia

Sumter
Charleston
......................... Columbia

.............
........................

_-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss4/3

Washington, D. C.
Charleston

8

et al.: South Carolina Bar Association Annual Business Meeting
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
Lawrence D. Stoney .........................................................
Theodore DuB. Stoney ................
LeRoy M. Want ................................................................
A. Z. F. Wood ......................

Charleston
Charleston
Darlington
Lancaster

The Memorial Committee, consisting of F. William Cappelmann, Chairman, Henry Osborne, A. F. Woods, Henry S.
Edmonds, M. G. McDonald, reported the deaths during the
past year of fourteen members, and that these and the brethren of the Bar who were furnishing the memorials are as
follows:
Memorial By
Deceased Lawyers
Cappelmann
F.
Wm.
Thomas Clanton Brown ....................................
Richard Eugene Carwile ................................ J. Edwin Belser, Sr.
Huger Sinkler
John L Cosgrove ..............
George D. Levy
John B. Duffle .................
Solomon Blatt
Goff Miller Greene ..................
A. W. Holman
William Walker Hawes .............
Paul A. Sansbury
Benedict W. Hyman ..............
Lambert Whitfield Jones ............................ C. Emile Saint-Amand
T. Pou Taylor
Kenneth R. Kreps ........................................................
... ..W. Rene Symmes
James Allan Merritt .............
John A. Henry
Eugene Pollard .....................
Henry C. Walker
H. Klugh Purdy. ......................................................
Sam Jerome RoyalL ............ Emil T. Cannon and Jack Wright
Harry L. Erckman
.....
George Frederick von Kolnitz .

Mr. Cappelmann stated that these memorials would be

published in the SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY and he
recommended that about seven of these be published in one
issue and seven in another.
The Association approved the recommendation and stood
in silence for one minute as a tribute to these departed
members. '
D. W. Robinson, on behalf of the Grievance Committee
consisting of D. W. Robinson, Chairman, 0. T. Wallace, Henry
C. Jennings, John M. Sprott, and S. S. Tison, reported as
follows:
During the year the Committee has had a few complaints dealing
with collection and fee matters. In the opinion of the Committee none
of these matters required hearings.
In connection with these complaints the Committee makes two recommendations to the lawyers of the State in connection with collection
matters. The first is that where the claimant has advanced court costs
that suit be started promptly or the money returned. The second is that
lawyers either answer letters relating to claims in their possession
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or return the claim. *If these suggestions are followed, many of the
complaints coming from collection agencies will be eliminated.
DivoRCE: On the endorsement of the South Carolina Bar Association
the people adopted a constitutional amendment permitting divorces
and the General Assembly has implemented this Amendment with a
divorce statute. If the statute is well administered it is believed that
South Carolina will benefit. If not, the Bar may have done a disservice.
It seems to the Committee that the lawyers have the primary responsibility for seeing that divorces are properly administered. Circuit
Judges will have to depend largely on the Bar, particularly in uncontested matters, for advice and help. The statute permits divorces on
reasonable grounds but does not contemplate that a divorce may be
granted because the parties tire of each other or are merely incompatible. If lawyers are lax in insisting that the grounds of the statute
be followed there will be many cases of perjury and much imposition.
on the Courts.
The Committee recommends that the Association go on record in
support of a strict and careful compliance with all of the requirement%
of the divorce statute.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES: Members of the Committee have
received a number of complaints about two phases of the administration
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Committee feels that these
matters should be called to the attention of the Association for such
action as the Association deems appropriate.
The first complaint is that claimant's cases before the Commission
are being channeled to certain lawyers in the State or that certain
lawyers in the State are being advised of the pendency of claims. The
Act does not contemplate that the members of the Commission or any
of the employees of the Commission shall have the power to select
attorneys for claimants and it does not contemplate that this may be
effected by suggesting certain lawyers or by furnishing lawyers with
information of pending cases. The claimant should be free to choose
any lawyer of his own selection and he should not be influenced in any
way by suggestions from any one connected with the Commission.
The Canons of Ethics of the Bar Association expressly prohibit the
solicitation of business by lawyers, and it is equally unprofessional
.to have business solicited for lawyers by other persons.
The Committee recommends that the Association go on record as
opposed to any procedure under which any lawyer is favored in securing business before the Commission and that the incoming President
appoint a Committee to confer with the Industrial Commission to see
that any present practice tending to channel business to any particular lawyer is discontinued.
The second complaint which has come to members of the Committee
is that excessive legal fees are being charged and allowed in certain
cases before the Commission. While the information before the Committee does not indicate that this is general practice, it is true that
an occasional excessive charge reflects on the entire Bar. Lawyers
should have in mind that percentage contracts which were entirely
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fair and reasonable with reference to negligence cases at common
law may well be excessive for handling cases under the statute where
it is no longer necessary to prove actionable negligence. The Committee
recommends that the incoming administration appoint a Committee to
confer with the Commission and to study fee schedules of other states
to ascertain whether it is practical to set up a fee schedule for cases
before the Commission.

This report was received as information and its recommendations approved.
The President stated that he had invited representatives
of the Editorial Staff of the SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY to be guests of the Association at this meeting and he
then presented these. The Editor-in-Chief, H. Grady Kirven,
told of the work of the staff and expressed the appreciation
of the staff for the fine support and co-operation of the Association and its members.
Marion F. Winter of the Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law made its report. Its members are J. Claude
Fort, Chairman, James F. Dreher, R. E. Harrell, Mr. Winter
and Edward M. Parler.
MR. WINTER:
Your Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law hereby reports
that few complaints have come to our attention, and none have required direct action by us.
However, the nature of the few complaints we have received would
seem to indicate that there may be trends in connection with the subject for which this Committee was created, which should be watched
very carefully, and we believe that some definite action should be
taken at this annual meeting or in the near future.
The matters that have come before us, though the complaints have
been few, have been under two general headings, and represent developments over a considerable period of time.
I-PRAcTICE By .PERsoNS OTHER THAN ATTORNEYS IN Nuw Fmms
iN WHICH LAWYERS HAVE NOT KEPT Up WiTH DEVELOPMENTS
The Richland County Bar Association referred to this Committee
a report of its Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, in connection with the decision in the case of In re: N. Y. County Lavnvr o'
Association v. Bercu. This case was reported in 273 App. Div. 524,
78 N.Y.S. (2d) 209, revising 188 Misc. 406, 69 N.Y.S. (2d) 730. In this
case, as is probably known to the members of this Association, Bercu,
a Certified Public Accountant, is enjoined from committing certain
acts complained of and "From holding himself out or assuming, using
or advertising himself as a tax counsel, tax counsellor, or tax consultant, or by any equivalent designation". A communication by the
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Richland County Committee was sent to all members of the Richland
County Bar Association calling attention to the effect of this decision
as to Accountants, and also calling attention to various others practicing law without authority, such as professional trustees (trustee
departments of banks), lending agencies, real estate brokers, and magistrates. A copy of this communication is attached to this report and it
should be made available to our membership.

II-THE

PREPARATION OF DEEDS, WILLS, MORTGAGES AND OTHER

LEGAL DocUmENTs BY COUNTY OFFICIALS
From Lancaster County, a communication was addressed to 'the
President of the South Carolina Bar Association, by Mr. Ed M. Parler,
a member of our Committee, who is also a member of the bar of
Lancaster County, calling attention to the drawing of Deeds and other
papers by the Clerk of Court, the drawing of Attachment and Claim
and Delivery papers by local Magistrates, and certain questionable
practices by others. A copy of Mr. Parler's letter and a copy of a
letter by members of the Lancaster County Bar addressed to the Clerk
of Court are attached to this report and should also be called to the
attention of our membership.
111-TH

REMEDY

It is seldom that members of the Bar in small counties are in a
position to take any worthwhile action to correct either of these situations. In the smaller counties, while a lawyer or lawyers will engage in preparing income tax returns, many of the lawyers decline to
go into this subject at all One oi- two lawyers can not possibly take
care of all of the income tax returns for the people of his county who
desire assistance and prefer not to go to the income tax employees
designated to give assistance on certain days. In a rural county, it is
likely that little improvement can be expected in this line. These
officials, who assist income taxpayers, are generally poorly trained,
if trained at all, and the most that can be done is to advise the taxpayers to pay.
There are few attorneys equipped to give advice on labor questions,
and many other of the questions arising under laws setting up agencies,
boards, commissions, and administrators, and, consequently, persons who
are not lawyers but who know something of the law in question, even
though their services are often expensive, are in demand at times when
employers or business people fear they have misunderstood the law or
interpretation thereof.
In 1945, the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of the
American Bar Association offered .a postwar plan for the suppression
of unauthorized practice of law. This plan can be found commencing
at page 258 of Volume 70, Reports of American Bar Association, 1945.
The chief point in their recommendations seems to be educationeducation of lawyers, education of the public, education of groups
whose business involves the knowledge of law. If this plan is to be
carried out, the State Bar Association and the various County Bar
Associations must help.
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This whole program should be studied and our Association should
cooperate to whatever extent it finds practicable. If we do not find
it feasible to carry out all of the recommendations in the, report
of the American Bar Association, we believe it would make a substantial contribution toward correcting some of the practices mentioned, if the South Carolina Bar Association would follow a plan
instigated by the Weatherford Bar Association in Texas, reported at
page 208 of Volume 71 of the Reports of American Bar Association,
1946, by printing a poster to be submitted to various offices in the
counties of this State in substantially the following form:
"WE DO NOT PRACTICE LAW"
"For the protection of the public, the practice of law has
been, by STATE LAW, restricted to duly licensed attorneys,
specially trained for their profession and subject at all times
to the discipline of the Courts.
"We therefore do not attempt to prepare for others deeds,
notes, mortgages, wills, contracts, or other legal instruments,
or advise or assist in connection with their preparation."
(Posted in co-operation with the South Carolina Bar.)
We co!ild not compel any public officer or individual to post such a
notice in his office, but we are sure that through the good offices of
the South Carolina Bar Association and with the cooperation of certain
local lawyers, such a notice could be posted in many of the places
where violations have occurred and would be of benefit to the public, as
a protection against the errors of persons not legally trained, and in
some cases the officers and individuals themselves would be glad of the
opportunity to stop such practices without losing the good will of some
of their friends.

This report was approved and received as information by
the Association and was voted to be referred to the next Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law.
The President next called for the report of the Committee
on Publications. The Committee consists of Charles I. Dial,
Chairman, Douglas McKay, Jr., J. Bratton Davis, A. Frank
Lever, Jr., and Samuel Prince. Mr. Davis read the report.
MR. DAVIS:
Your Committee on Publications begs leave to report:
That, in accordance with the report of the sub-committee of the
committee on the Law School, made by Mr. L. W. Perrin, and which was
unanimously adopted by the Association, the Executive Committee of
the Association, who were given full power thereto, have approved
the combining of the publication of the University of South Carolina
Law School with the Transactions of the Annual Meetings of the South
Carolina Bar Association. The Foreword to Part I, Vol. I, of the
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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY of September, 1948, is by the Executive Committee of this Association and fully explains their actions.
In accordance therewith there has come into being the SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY and Parts I and II of Volume I, issued in September
and December of 1948, contain a complete and comprehensive report
of the transactions of the Fifty-fourth Annual Meeting of the South
Carolina Bar Association. In addition these two issues of the law
quarterly, in their review sections, carry nine articles by outstanding
members of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina of real interest to
every practising attorney in this state.
Your committee feels that the actions of the Executive Committee
of this Association, the Secretary of this Association, the faculty and
members of the University of South Carolina Law School, the contributors to the review section, and all others who participated in or were
responsible for the SOUTH CAROLINA LAw QUARTERLY should be highly
commended and that the appreciation of this Association for their
efforts and accomplishments should be extended to each and every one
of these gentlemen.
All of which is respectfully submitted.

This report was received as information and approved.
The President then recognized Henry Busby of the Aiken

Bar.
MR. BUSBY:
I offer the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED by the South Carolina Bar Association that Act No. 136, Acts S. C., 1945, approved April 24th,
1945, providing for the retirement of Justices of the Supreme
Court and Judges of the Circuit Courts, should be amended by
the General Assembly of the State in the following particular:
(1.) By striking out "Section 1-A" of said Act, which provides that Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the
Circuit Courts shall be automatically retired upon reaching
the age of seventy-two (72) years.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Secretary of this
Association furnish a copy of this Resolution to the presiding
officer of each House of the General Assembly upon the first
day of the 1950 session thereof.

This resolution was duly seconded, well considered and ably
debated but failed to pass.
At this point the President announced that due to the
press of time, all other business matters would be carried
over until the business session on Friday morning. He requested that the members of the Association assemble according to Judicial Circuits and elect their respective officers
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for the year of 1949-1950 and that each circuit appoint a
member of the Nominating Committee. The President further
requested that the Nominating Committee meet on Friday
morning, before the business session, and be prepared to
present their nominations for the officers of the Association
for the year 1949-1950 at the business session Friday morning. The meeting adjourned.
During the afternoon, while the Association was in session, the visiting ladies were conducted by the wives of the
Charleston Bar in a delightful tour of historic homes of the

city.
At six (6) P.M., Major and Mrs. J. D. E. Meyer entertained the members of the Association and their ladies at
a cocktail party at the office building of Major Meyer. Major
Meyer is President of the Charleston County Bar Association.
At eight (8) P.M., Honorable James F. Byrnes addressed
the Association at the Dock Street Theater on our foreign
affairs.
At nine (9) P.M., came the annual reception and dance of
the association.

SECOND BUSINESS MEETING
Friday, May 6, 1949, at 10 o'clock A.1VL
Charleston, S. C.
The South Carolina Bar Association reconvened in business session at the Fort Sumter Hotel at 10 o'clock A.M.,
May 6, 1949, at Charleston, S. C., Honorable George Warren,
President presiding.
At the opening of the second business session, the President called upon the Honorable Judge L. D. Lide for the
report of the Committee on Administrative Law. The report
was as follows:
To the South Carolina Bar Association:
Your Committee on Administrative Law begs leave to report au

follows:
The subject with which we are concerned is indeed a broad one,
and becomes of more and more practical importance from year to
year, as will be seen by reference to the reports of our predecessor
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Committees, relating particularly to the "Federal Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946", which impresses us as an important
advancement in this field, and worthy of the attention of our General
Assembly, as the basis, in many respects, of improvements which might
be made with reference to the procedure of all State administrative
agencies.
We have, however, concluded that, in order to avoid mere generalities, we should limit our attention to the South Carolina Industrial
Commission, that being at this time perhaps the most important one
of our administrative bodies, from the legal viewpoint.
The Industrial Commission owes its existence to our Workmen's
Compensation Act, which was enacted by the General Assembly in the
year 1935 and became effective during that year. This act to a considerable extent was a literal transcript of the North Carolina Act
on this subject, which followed the pattern embodied in like acts in
many states in the Union. This legislation originated out of certain
social needs, due to the increasing industrialization of our civilization.
The right of industrial laborers to fair compensation for injuries,
arising out of and in the course of their employment, finally received
proper recognition, and it became apparent that some of the common
law rules and methods required modification, in the interest of all
parties.
The Industrial Commissions were thus charged with great and novel
responsibilities, both administrative and quasi-judicial; and the bar
and the bench were likewise confronted with new problems. Referring particularly to our own Industrial Commission, a large volume
of business has been handled by it, and Workmen's Compensation cases
now constitute a considerable part of the opinions of the Supreme
Court, although many cases are not appealed from the Circuit Court.
And of course there are a number of claims settled by the Commission,
which do not go into the Courts. When the extensive activities of this
Commission are considered, it is not surprising that some adverse
criticism has arisen, and there has been a good deal of agitation for
some amendments to the law. We shall of course not enter into any
detail with regard to the criticism or the merits thereof, but Are rather
impressed with the fact that the permanence of legislation of this
kind is generally recognized, and it is felt that whatever defects may
exist in the law as it now stands, or in the administration thereof,
they are of such a nature that they may be remedied; and that, allowing
for all just criticism, much good has been accomplished.
It is of interest to observe that a book has been recently published,
entitled "Workmen's Compensation in South Carolina", written by Dr.
William Hays Simpson, a professor in Duke University, and in which
he makes many interesting suggestions relating to the amendment
of the law, and calls attention to some reported deficiencies in its administration. Likewise a committee appointed by the South Carolina
State Chamber of Commerce has investigated the whole matter with
apparent care, and has also made a report suggesting numerous amendments, looking to the improvement of the law and its administration;
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and awards for disfigurement seem to be the cause of considerable adverse comment. And all the suggestions which have come to our attention, made by others interested in the matter, include an amendment
empowering the Courts on appeal to review all awards, both as to the
facts and the law, in order to maintain confidence in the just and
efficient administration of the statute.
We have not given any special consideration to a number of other
recommendations which may have much importance, socially and economically, but we believe that it is proper for us to consider the matters immediately related to the judicial or quasi-judicial functions of
the Industrial Commission, and to express our opinion, .for the consideration of the Association, as to whether the law should be amended
in respect to such matters. And after due consideration we are of the
opinion that the law should be amended so as to provide that the Courts,
upon an appeal from the Industrial Commission, shall have the same
powers and duties as upon an appeal or review in an equity case; and
we believe there is sound reason for such an amendment, when it ia
observed that the Workmen's Compensation Act is really based upon
an extension of the fundamental principles of equity, resulting in remedies unknown to the common law. The result of such a change would
simply mean that a Court review of the action of the Industrial Commission upon the facts of any claim must be governed by the preponderance of the evidence, in the light, however, of the established presumptions in equity in favor of the respondent. Such a change in the
law would not in any wise be radical, for even under the present Act
the power of the Court to review the facts, in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence, is recognized, In all jurisdictional matters.
Miles v. West VirginiaPulp & Paper Co., 212 S.C. 424, 48 S.E. (2d) 26.
We are also of opinion that it should further be provided in such
an amendment, that upon an appeal from the Industrial Commission the
same rule would apply as upon appeals from inferior Cburts (notwithstanding the fact that the Industrial Commission is not recognized as a
Court), to wit, that upon appeal, judgment shall be given "according
to the justice of the case without regard to technical errors and defects
which do not affect the merits"; in accordance with Section 804, Code
1942.
Under the present practice awards made for disfigurement are sometimes met with adverse criticism due to the fact that the statute merely
fixes the maximum award, and the power of the Court on appeal relating to the anwunt thereof is now apparently limited to cases, if such
there be, where the award is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
But we believe that if the suggested amendment were made sufficiently
comprehensive to provide that the amount of any award might upon
appeal be reduced or increased by the Courts, within the limits of the
statute, according to the preponderance of the evidence, including a view
of the claimant, under the practice now prevailing, the result would be
in furtherance of justice.
Accordingly, we recommend that this report be referred to the Committee on Legislation of the Association, with instructions to take such
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steps as may be appropriate, looking to the amendment of the Workmen's Compensation Act by the General Assembly in accordance, or
substantial accordance, with the suggestions hereinbefore contained.
Respectfully submitted,

L. D. LImE, Chairman
M. M. MANN
ERNEST B. CASTLES
J. ALEX NEELY, J.
J. HENRY JOHNSON

By motion duly made the Association approved the reljort

and voted to refer the same to the Committee on Legislation.
L. Marion Gressette, Chairman of the Auditing Committee, reported that the books and accounts of the SecretaryTreasurer were in order and moved that his report as made
on Thursday be approved. This motion was duly carried.
The Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, headed
by Prof. Coleman Karesh as Chairman, submitted their report in five (5) parts. Part I, submitted for approval, was
unanimously approved. The other four (4) parts were submitted and received as information. Part V in particular was
referred to the succeeding committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform. The report is as follows:
PART I
WILLS-AGE REQUIREMENTS
Recommendation:
The same age requirements should be prescribed as to all wills,
-whether of real or personal property, without regard to sex.
Comment:
There are at present two separate requirements with respect to age
governing wills. In the case of wills of real property, the requirement
is that the testator be of the age of twenty-one years. No distinction
is made as to sex. Sec. 8915, Code of Laws, 1942. In the case of wills
of personal property, there is no applicable statute, but the common
law prevails. That law, borrowed from the ecclesiastical court, which
originally had jurisdiction of wills of testaments, is that a will of personal property may be made by a minor of the age of 14 if a maIe,
of 12 if a female. Posey v. Posey, 3 Strobhart Law 167 (1848); Major
-v. Hunt, 64 S. C. 97, 41 S. E. 816 (1901).
In the Posey case the will of a testatrix of the age of eighteen was
sustained. The principal objection to the will was that the Act of 1824
(VI Stat., 238) placing wills of personal property on a level with wills
of real property abolished all distinction between the two types of wills;

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss4/3

18

et al.: South Carolina Bar Association Annual Business Meeting
328

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

but the Court held that the Act merely undertook to provide that the
formalities for execution of the two types of wills should be the same.
The Judge writing the opinion pointed out that in England and in many
of the American states the law had been changed by statutory enactment, and expressed his opinion that the age level should be raised.
In a separate concurring opinion, in which two judges joined, Judge
Withers said:
"As a Judge I feel constrained to hold that the testatrix wac3
competent to make the will in question-for I suppose such to be
the common law, no matter whence the principle be derived. At the
same time I deem the decision to present an incongruity, and that
the subject was omitted by accident in passing the Act of 1824.
I am able to see, so far as mere policy is concerned, no reason why
a minor shall not devise real estate, yet he may bequeath personalty."
The quoted observation on policy makes as much sense today as it
did when it was made. It makes even more sense, with the greater
part that personal property plays in the accumulation of wealth. As
much care ought to be exercised and as much discretion required in the
disposition of personal property as in the testamentary disposition of
real property. Actually, it is mere accident that there has .been thir.
difference in age requirements, based on the nature of the property
and the sex of the testator. The ecclesiastical minimum of 12 for female
and 14 for male, as marking the floor level of discretion, is of the same
minimal requirement for common law marriage in this state. Despita
a higher age requirement for consent to sexual intercourse and a higher
age level for marriage licenses, the law in South Carolina still is that
a valid marriage may be had by a female of the age of 12 and a male
of the age of 14. See State v. Ward, 204 S. C. 210, 28 S. E. (2d) 786
(1944).
South Carolina seems to be the only state that has retained intact
the common law age requirements for wills of personal property. Most
states make no distinction between the nature of the property or the
sex of the testator. Of these 21 require age 21; 13 require age 18, 1 requires age 16; 1 requires age 20; 2 require age 14 (Georgia and Puerto
Rico).
Of the remaining states and territories, distinctions based on property or sex exist as follows: 5 states require age 21 for real property,
18 for personal; 1 state-21 for real, 17 for personal; 2 states require
age 21, or any age if married; 2 states require 21 for male, 18 for
female; I state requires 21 for real and personal, but 18 for a male, if
personal; I state requires age 21 for real and personal, but 18 if testatrix
is married woman; 1 state requires age 21, or 18 if married. South Carolina's distinctions based on sex and property have been mentioned.
In any event, there seems to be no point now to make distinctions
based on sex or property, and there should lie uniformity in both these
respects. Wills of real estate require age 21; deeds require age 21 under
penalty of avoidance; and the simplest contract requires a contractor
of full age under similar hazard of disaffirmance. In none of these cases
does the sex of the party matter, as it should not. It is hard to justify
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a difference based on sex or age between wills of personal property
and wills of real property, or between wills of personal property and
the other transactions mentioned. On the other hand, it is commonly
stated that "ordinarily one need not have full mental contractual capacity in order to make a valid willF--that it requires less capacity to
make a will than a contract. McCollum v. Banks, 213 S. C. 476, 50 S.E.
(2d) 199 (1948). This being so, there is considerable warrant for lowering the age limit for wills of real property to, say, age 18. Correspondingly, the age minimum for testators of both sexes should be raised
to the same age, for wills of personal property. The main objective
should at all events be the elimination of the distinction based onsex
and property and a uniform requirement for wills of real and personal
property. The reasonable and recommended requirement is that the minimum age for testators be 18, without regard to sex of the testator or
the nature of the property.
PART II
REAL PROPERTY-DEEDS--DISPENSING WITH WORDS
OF INHERITANCE
Recommendation:
Words of inheritance should not be required in deeds in order to
transfer a fee.
Comment:
It is familiar law, not requiring citation of authority, that in order
to transfer a fee by deed it is necessary that words of inheritance be
used either in the granting clause or in the habendum. Whether this
conforms to the intention of the parties or not, the failure to insert
such words will operate to create only a life estate. No draftsman undertakes to transfer a life estate merely by omitting words of inheritance: he takes pains to make it plain that only a life estate is thus
intended by expressly stating that the transfer is for the life of the
grantee only. Where deeds are prepared by laymen, it is only by the
happy circumstance that the printed form of deed carries the sacred
word "heirs" that the intention to pass the fee is preserved. On the
other hand, deeds executed in other states where deeds do no require
the magic word are often ineffective to transfer properly the fee to
lands in this state. Of course, if the transfer has been made for value,
the deed can be reformed by suit for that purpose. On the other hand,
if the grantee is a donee, he will be confined to a life estate and will
have no recourse to equity for reformation, in view of its refusal to
aid a volunteer.
Forty-one jurisdictions (including Alaska and District of Columbia)
-see Restatement Property, Sees. 27 and 39, and 1948 Supplementhave eliminated the requirement for the use of words of inheritance
in order to transfer the fee by deed. Most statutes, in those states, provide simply that every transfer shall transfer the fee, without the use
of such words, unless a contrary intent appears.
There has always been a certain sympathy for allowing the intent
of the transferrer to prevail. Since 1824, it has been unnecessary to use
words of inheritance in devises. Sec. 8923 provides as follows:
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"No words of limitation shall be necessary to convey an estate
in fee simple by devise, but every gift of land by devise shall be
considered as a gift in fee simple, unless such a construction be inconsistent with the will of the testator, expressed or implied."
This section obviously is limited to wills and has expressly been
stated by the Courts to have no application to deeds. McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S. C. 555, 29 S. E. 403 (1897); Sullivan v. Moore, 84 S. C.
426, 65 S. E. 108 (1909); McMillan v. Hughes, 88 S. C. 296, 70 S. E.
804 (1911). In the Sullivan-Moore case this language is used:
"This is the'rule of the common law from which the Courts cannot escape, though its operation nearly always results in the injustice of defeating the intention of the parties. The rule serves generally as a snare to those unlearned in technical law, and it would
be difficult to suggest any reason for its continued existence."
Trust deeds have always been exempt from this strangling rule, and
the intent is always given effect. It has long been the law that words
of inheritance need not be used either after the trustee's name or the
beneficiary's. See, among other cases, Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C. 277
(1880).
Deeds from officers (Judge, Master, etc.) while customarily carrying
words of inheritance, do not require them, and the fee will pass according to the intent. Sumter Fertilizer Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 206 S. C. 446,
34 S. E. (2d) 681 (1944).
Mortgages designed to create a lien upon the fee do not require
words of inheritance, although when foreclosed the purchaser will obtain
the fee. The lack of necessity for the words is due to the fact that
under Sec. 8701 of the Code a mortgage does not transfer a fee but
merely creats a lien. Bredenburg v. Lazdrum, 32 S. C. 215, 10 S. E.
956 (1889).
In view of the inclination of the Courts to give effect to the intent
where possible, except where prevented by firmly imbedded principles
of law, and in view of the realization and admission by the Courts
themselves that no sound reason can be suggested for retaining this
admittedly harsh rule, a statute should be adopted putting deeds on
a parity with wills. No upheaval will result from this concededly realistic and fair provision. There is nothing in the legal structure that will
stand in its way or that will be adversely affected by it. The bar can
adjust itself to the change without undue inconvenience and will expose
itself, at most, only to a minor change in thinking.
Memorandum:
Three of the members of the committee agree that words of inheritance in deeds should not be required for the purpose of transferring
a fee. One member disapproves on the ground that the law is so well
established that no particular harm can come from the retention of the
rule, and that the omission of the words of inheritance is usually an
understandably negligent act on the part of laymen who draw their
own deeds; and that a change would be productive of more uncertainty
and litigation than there now are.
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PART III

TRUSTS-THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
Recommendation:
The cy pres doctrine should be adopted by statute as part of the
law of trusts.
Comment:
The cy pres doctrine is thus stated in the Restatement of TrustsSec. 399:
"If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or
illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the
application of the property to some charitable, purpose which falls
within the general charitable intention of the settlor."
As is further pointed out in the comment to this section: "The expression indicates that where the exact intention of the settlor is not
carried out, his intention is carried out 'as nearly as' may be."
Another adequate statement of the doctrine is to be found in an
annotation in 74 A.L.R. at page 671:
"It not infrequently occurs that the method of executing a charitable trust defined by the terms of the instrument creating it is
impracticable or illegal. In those jurisdictions wherein the cy pres
doctrine is recognized, it is quite generally held in such circumstances that, if the instrument indicates a general intention or dominant purpose on the part of the donor that the property is to be
devoted to charitable purposes regardless of the peculiar method
of execution, the cy pres doctrine will be applied. Numerous authorities support this rule and converse-that where the charitable purpose is limited to a particular object or to a particular institution,
and no general charitable intent is manifest from the instrument,
then, if it becomes impossible to carry out the object, or the institution ceases to exist before the gift has taken effect, the doctrine
of cy pres does not apply, and in the absence of any limitation over,
or other provision, the legacy lapses."
As will be seen from the above, the cardinal purpose of the cy pres
doctrine is to give effect to the general or dominant charitable intention where the particular purpose, which is merely a means to the
affectuation of the larger, is impossible or impracticable. From the subjective point of view, it is certainly reasonable to assume that a settlor
with a general charitable purpose, but prescribing a particular mode
of execution, would prefer the application by a Court of Equity of the
property to some purpose as near as that which he had in mind to a
failure of the trust altogether. In the case of a trust established by
will, as is generally the fact, such a failure would bring about a
restoration to inheritance of those whom the settlor has attempted to
exclude by his will.
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The cy pros doctrine has largely been recognized by the Courts of
this country as being existent and as a part of the equity jurisdiction.
According to Bogart in his work on Trusts (Sec. 433), of the states
which have had occasion to consider the doctrine, only seven have repudiated it. In this category is South Carolina. In some states the doctrine has been accepted by statute, but in most it has been treated as
inherent in the equity power.
The cy pres doctrine which is being discussed is what is known as
the equitable or judicial cy pres, and is to be distinguished from the
prerogative cy pres-a right lodged in the crown or sovereign. In the
prerogative ci p'res the sovereign could allocate the trust fund to a
purpose entirely foreign to that contemplated by the donor. Suffice it
to say, that power has never been accepted as compatible with our institutions. Another type of prerogative cig pres is to be found in cases
where no trustee is named and the fund is given simply to charity
without specification. In such instance the crown could select the charity.
That form of prerogative cy pres is more or less present in the liberalizing Act of the South Carolina General Assembly of 1925, now
designated as Sec. 9053 of the Code, which among other things,
authorizes the Court to appoint a trustee where none is named and
the charity is not designated but is left to the trustee's discretion.
The repudiation of the equitable Cy pres in this state dates back to
the case of Attorney General v. Jolly, 2 Strobbart Eq. 379 (1849), in
which the Court, after finding that the particular Methodist Church
mentioned in the will in question could not take the benefits set out
in the will, refused to accept the view that the Church at large could
take. Without referring to the doctrine by name, the Court there said:
"The question is whether if the legacy had been to the church,
by name, the government of the denomination to which it is attached is such as to prevent its receiving the benefits intended.
If that were the case, it by no means follows that the Court would
be bound to divert the legacy to other kindred objects. It (the doetrine) has never been adopted, to our knowledge, or recognized in
our courts, and we are persuaded that it ought not to be adopted."
Just what prior cases had dealt with the problem of the doctrine
does not appear, and no reason is given for failure to adopt the doctrine. There was, and is, no question that the English courts had long
previously sanctioned it, and the American decisions were in the main
the same way. It may be presumptuous to suggest it, but it is quite
possible that the Court was thinking of the prerogative cy pres.
The principle enunciated in the case just quoted from was accepted
with more force in Pringle -v. Dorsey, 3 S. C. 502 (1872). There the
trust was for the benefit of a particular congregation, which thereafter
went out of existence. The Court held that the property reverted to
the donor, and that it could not be applied to similar church purposes.
The Court used this language;
"The doctrine of cy pres is inconsistent with our institutions,
and has never prevailed in this State. It is an arbitrary rule
introduced into the common law from the civil law, clothing the
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judges with a discretion regulated by no rules and principles, but
depending entirely on the exercise of their will. We Would hesitate
long before we endorsed it, even if, by the force of authority we
were compelled to adopt it."
It might be pointed out that the Court could have reached the
same result without recourse to, and the rejection of, the cy pres
doctrine, on the ground, as it did find, that there was a purpose to
benefit but one particular congregation, and that there was no general
intention to confer a charitable benefit. Even in cy pres jurisdictions,
it has been noted, if the intention is not general, the trust will fail if
the specified purpose cannot be carried out.
By virtue of these two cases, the cy pres doctrine has been held
thereafter repeatedly not to be of force in this .state. Mars v. Gibert,
93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1912); City of Columbia v. Monteith, 139
S. C. 262, 137 S. E. 727 (1926).
The Mars-Gibert case, perhaps the best known of the cases dealing
with the question in this state, actually, by a liberal interpretation,
seems to have approved the doctrine while at the same time specifically
stating that it was not the law in this state. In that ease the will of
John De Ia Howe was involved. The will left property to trustees to
be used in "founding and maintaining an agricultural and mechanical
school on his land in Abbeville County in which twelve p6or boys and
twelve poor girls were to be supported and taught and in which the
children living in the neighborhood who chose to attend were also to be
instructed." Finding the scheme impracticable as delineated in the will,
the trustees sought to establish scholarships at Winthrop College and
Clemson College. This course of conduct was not approved by the Court,
but the Court went on to hold that the trustees could operate in conjunction with the Abbeville County authorities. Justice Woods rationalized this result by saying:
"It does not result, however, that the details of the plan laid down
in the will must be followed to the letter. The main purpose being
kept in view, considerable flexibility will always be allowed in the
details of the execution of a trust, so as to adapt it to changed
conditions."
Of this language, Bogert (See. 433) says: "This seems to be denying the existence of cy pres in one breath and applying it in a disguised and limited form in the same sentence."
The cy pres doctrine aims at the fulfilment of the purpose of the
settlor in the overall or dominant sense. Approximations, not strictly
cy pres, can be found in charities, as in Patton v. First Presbyterian
Church, 129 S. C. 15, 123 S.E. 493 (1924), where the Court authorized
the sale of property given for church purposes, the proceeds to be used
in the purchase of another site and erection of another structure, the
change being necessitated by the unsuitable character of the location
of the original church property. The Court justified its decision by treating it as a sale for the purpose of reinvestment, although it is clear
that the settlor intended that the particular property should be used
for the designated purpose. Here, it is obvious, under any view, that
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the dominant intention of the testator is not being thwarted by the
removal of the church to a more ideal location.
While the cy pres doctrine is not to be found in private, as distinguished from charitable, trusts, analogies in the field of the private
trust are plentiful. In order to carry out the dominant purpose of the
settlor, the Court will permit a deviation from the terms of the trust.
Thus, the power of the Court to order a sale of the trust property,
where no such power is to be found in the trust instrument, is well
recognized. The Court has even gone so far as to permit a sale of trust
property where the trust instrument in terms forbade a sale, on the
ground that in so doing the principal object of the trust was being subserved. Wingard v. Hennessee, 206 S. C. 159, 33 S. E. (2d) 390 (1944).
See, also, Neeley v. Peoples Bank, 133 S. C. 43, 130 S. E. 550 (1925),
where the trust instrument, creating a trust for the settler, provided
that no part of the trust corpus should be used without the consent of
the settlor, and the settlor thereafter becoming non compos and incapable of consent the court authorized an invasion of the corpus for her
benefit. A powerful airmation of the power of the Court to permit or
direct a deviation from the terms of the trust, in order to prevent the
defeat of the purposes of the settlor, is to be found in the case of Weston v. Weston, 210 S. C. 1, 41 S. E. (2d) 372 (1947).
Charities have always been favored in the law. The absence of the
cy pres doctrine is a serious gap in an otherwise well constructed body
of trust law. Just as the legislature in 1925 filled in many of the misEing elements in the existent law of charities in this state, so should it
fill in now the most important absent ingredient-the cy pres doctrine.
PART IV

LEGITIMATION OF CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK BY
SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF PARENTS
Recommendation:
There should be a general law, applicable to the entire State, legitimating a child born out of wedlock by the subsequent marriage of its
parents.
Comment:
Under Sec. 255, Subdivision 19 of the Code it is provided:
"If parents subsequently marry the child becomes legitimate as
if born in lawful wedlock. The putative father of any illegitimate
may apply by petition in writing to the Children's Court (Probate
Court) of the county in which the father may reside, praying that
such child may be declared legitimate. And if it shall appear that
the petitioner is reputed the father of the child, the Court may
thereupon declare and pronounce the child legitimate."
The entire section from which the above is quoted is under a general
heading "Jurisdiction of Probate Court in Counties having a population
between 85,000 and 100,000 as to Certain Minors." Presumably and
ostensibly it, and all its provisions, are limited to such counties.
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In the case of Foster v. Roland, 205 S. C. 457, 32 S. E. (2d) 375
(1944), the Court, in a case from Spartanburg County (having a population within the numerical limits stated in the section), held that the
subsequent marriage of the parents of the child born out of wedlock legitimated the child, and that such marriage was in itself sufficient, without
any appearance of the father before the Probate Court. The Supreme
Court pointed out that "under the common law, legitimate children
were born in lawful wedlock. Children not so born were held illegitimate
even though their parents intermarried after birth"; but that the power
of the legislature to legitimatize children was plenary. The Court intimated, however, that the statute was of doubtful constitutionality
because of its possible violation of the constitutional inhibition of
special legislation; but the question not having been raised, the Court
did not pass upon the constitutional feature.
As matters stand, in counties within the population limits prescribed,
subsequent marriage makes the illegitimate child the legitimate child
of the father as well as of the mother. As to the latter, the child is
treated as legitimate under See. 8913, dating back to 1906. The constitutionality of the statute as to the counties affected is, of course,
doubtful, since there seems to be no individual or peculiar set of facts
that necessitates such a result in certain counties and not in others.
The other counties are admittedly not afforded such a privilege, in the
absence of statute. So that, in those counties, and probably in alk
counties, in view of probable unconstitutionality, subsequent marriage
does not legitimate as to the father. It is only just that all counties
have such liberalizing provisions.
The remaining provisions of the quoted section ought also to be
applied to all counties, and the putative father, on his petition, should
be declared to be the father for purposes of legitimation, with all its
consequences.
The subdivision quoted ought to be duplicated as a general statute.
Memorandum:
Three of the members of the committee are of the opinion that the
marriage of the parents alone should legitimate the child without the
necessity of a court proceeding to establish that fact; that is to say,
It would not be necessary to bring a court proceeding for the express
purpose of establishing legitimacy, or that court proceedings be a
condition precedent to the conversion of the illegitimate child to a
legitimate one.
PART V
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
Recommendation:
That, with the view of possible revision, .a reappraisal be made of
the Statute of Descent and Distribution in the following particulars:
1. The status of the next of kin.
2. The status of children and descendants.
3. The status of kin of the half-blood.
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Comment:
1. The Next of Kim-The status of the next of kin of an intestate
decedent has been, until the Amendment of 1945 (Act 1945/313), sub,
stantially as embodied in the original Statute of Descent and Distribution of 1791 and as in the original Statute of Distributions in England
of 1670, made of force in South Carolina in 1712. After brothers' and
sisters' children representation among collaterals was not permitted.
Thus, brothers and sisters and their children take per stirpes, but
grandnephews and grandnieces take per capita. Until 1945, uncles
and aunts, being kin in the third degree, excluded first cousins, children
of predeceased uncles and aunts, kin in the fourth degree. Under, the
amendment, first cousins take per stirpes. It will thus be seen that
considerable dislocation has taken place in the scheme for the taking
of the next of kin, in that first cousins take equally with uncles and
aunts, although the latter are one degree closer to the intestate. Moreover, first cousins now exclude grandnephews and grandnieces, although
both classes are kin in the fourth degree. Similarly, first cousins, being thus preferred, will exclude other kin in the fourth degree, such
as greatuncles and greataunts.
It will be admitted that the amendment of 1945 effected one extremely worthwhile change, and that is in giving the surviving spouse
of the intestate the entire estate after exhaustion of the classes through
the lineal ancestor. The widow or surviving husband will thus exclude
uncles, greatuncles and cousins, whereas previously she or he had to
share the estate with such remote kinsmen in the proportion of twothirds and one-third, and it was only where no next of kin could be
ascertained that the surviving spouse would take the entire estate.
No such justification can be had, where there is no surviving spouse,
for giving first cousins a preferred position. While the General Assembly can, as it sees fit, within constitutional limits, prescribe and
alter the course of descent (McCollum v. Snipes, 213 S. C. 254, 49 S. E.
(2d) 12, upholding the constitutionality of the 1945 amendment, and permitting first cousins to take per stirpes with a surviving uncle) the
amendment, save as it enlarges the right of the surviving spouse, does
not appeal as a matter of justice or fairness. Moreover, it does considerable violence to the otherwise admirable pattern for distribution
among the next of kin, altering the ancient principle that representation should not be permitted after brothers' and sisters' children. In
addition, it presents a further strange twist: by reason of the peculiar
law affecting kindred of the half-blood, nephews and nieces of the halfblood, although kin in the third degree, are excluded by uncles, kin in the
third degree, and first cousins, kin in the fourth degree; and this is
true even though the uncles, aunts and cousins may themselves be
of the half blood. See articles: Descent and Distributionin South Carolina: Present Version, by Julius B. Aiken, Year Book of the University
of S. C. School of Law, April, 1947; Descent and Distributionin South
Carolina, by John C. Bruton, Year Book, June, 1948.
2. Children and Descendants.-Under the Statute of Descent and
Distributions, children, along with the surviving spouse, take to the
exclusion of all other classes. Too, descendants of the intestate, no mat-
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ter how remote, will exclude all other classes. After providing that
children shall take equally, after the widow is provided for, Section 1
further declares:
"The lineal descendants of the intestate shall represent their respective parents, and shall take among them the share or shares to which
their parents would have been entitled had such parent survived
the intestate."
The taking, accordingly, under the quoted language is strictly per
stirpes. For example, if an intestte dies without leaving wife or
husband surviving, and leaving a living child and the children of a
predeceased child, the estate is divided into halves, one-half going to the
surviving child and the other half to the children of the predeceased
child. Further, if there are no living children but only grandchildren,
the grandchildren again take per stirpes. To illustrate: The intestate
has no living children, but is survived by a grandchild, child of one
predeceased child, and by five other grandchildren, children of another
predeceased child. The division will not be in sixths but in halves, the
sole child of one predeceased child taking one-half, and the other five
grandchildren taking the other half among them. The manifest injustice of this division, where no children are living and there are only
grandchildren, is needing of correction. Presumably all the grandchildren, all equally kin to the grandfather, are equally near and dear
to him; and it would probably come as a shock to the average layman
that if he were to die without a will and survived only by grandchildren
they would not take equally.
At least half of the states provide, through express statutory enactment or through interpretation, that, as to issue of the intestate "if
they are all in the same degree of kinship, they shall take equally, or if
of unequal degree, then those of more remote degrees shall take by
representation." The quoted language is taken from the Model Probate
Code and represents probably the best thinking today on the subject.
At any rate, permitting issue to take equally where all are equally kin
represents the fairer view.
What has been said of children and their descendants may apply in
the same fashion to brothers and sisters and their children. Under Section 2 of the Statute of Descent and Distribution, brothers and sisters
and children of predeceased brothers and sisters take, by representation. Thus, if an intestate was survived by a living brother and the
children of a predeceased brother, the taking would be by halves. Similarly,*if there were no brothers and sisters living, but only children
of predeceased brothers and sisters, the taking would be per stirpes; although again there are collaterals all equally removed from the intestate.
The same considerations applied to grandchildren should be applied to
nephews and nieces, and if there are no living brothers or sisters, they
should all take equally.
3. The Kin of the Half Blood.-The status of the kindred of the half
blood presents an interesting and difficult problem, which has not been
lessened, but increased, by the passage of the 1945 amendment to the
Statute of Descent and Distribution. See Comment 1. Under the orig-
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inal English Statute of Distribution of 1670, made of force in South
Carolina in 1712, no distinction was made between kin of the whole
blood and those of the half blood. This statute embraced, of course,
only personalty. On the other hand, under the canons of descent, with
their elaborate system of primogeniture, etc., kindred of the half blood
were altogether excluded.
When the present Statute of Descent and Distribution was enacted
in 1791, a single scheme of descent and distribution was adopted, so
that the heirs of the real property and the distributees of the personnl
property are the same. Our statute is based principally upon the Statute
of Distribution rather than upon the canons of descent, but in some
respects traces of the canons remain. They are to be found in the retention, to a limited extent, of the exclusion of kindred of the half blood
by those of the whole blood.'The exclusion is not entire, but is rather
one of postponement; and after the prescribed postponements kindred
of the whole blood and of the half blood are treated alike.
Under our present statute a brother or sister of the whole blood excludes a brother or sister of the half blood. Parents exclude brothers
and sisters of the half blood. Wren v. Carnes, 4 DeS. 405; Lawson v.
Perdriaux, 1 MdeCord 456 (1821). A brother of the half blood excludes
children of the brother of the half blood, no representation being allowed after children of brother or sister of the whole blood. EX Parto
Muys, 2 Richardson 61 (1845). A brother or sister of the half blood
will exclude a grandparent, but a grandparent will exclude the children
of a brother or sister of the half blood. Prior to the 1945 amendment
(putting cousins, children of predeceased uncles and aunts, on a parity
per stirpes with living uncles and aunts), uncles and aunts of the half
blood would exclude first cousins of the whole blood. Pouag v. Gadsden,
2 Bay 293 (1803); Karwon v. Lowndes, 2 DeSaussure 210; Perry v.
Logan, 5 Richardson Equity 202 (1853). First cousins of the whole
blood and those of the half blood take alike.
It will be seen from the foregoing that half blood kindred are not
altogether excluded but they are merely postponed. So far as the writer
of this memorandum has been able to discover, only three other states
prefer brothers or sisters of the whole blood to brothers or sisters of
the half blood, that is to say, excluding the latter altogether. In twelve
states there is no distinction made in any respect between the two types.
In at least sixteen states, there is no distinction, unless the real property came to the intestate.by descent, devise or gift from some one of
his ancestors. Thus, where an intestate had acquired property from his
father, and the mother remarried and had a child-the half brother of
the intestate-and the intestate thereafter died, the half brother, not
being of the blood of the intestate's father, would be excluded. This policy is based upon the doctrine of ancestral property, found in the canons
of descent, limiting the taking among collaterals to those of the blood
of the first purchaser. It is not a part of our statute, and the doctrine
was held not to be of force in this state. Shaffer v. Nail, 2 Brevard 160
(1810). In at least ten states brothers and sisters of the whole blood
do not exclude brothers and sisters of the half blood, but the latter
take only half shares.
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It is at least worthy of consideration whether the distinction between
the whole blood and the half blood should not be altogether eliminated.
Taking into account, not the legal, but the actual peraonal relationships
among the members of a family in which a parent has remarried and
has had other children, it seems strange that the law should disregard
the natural impulse of the members of such a family. The tie, in the
average case, is just as close between brothers and sisters of the half
blood as it is between the members of the classes themselves--the tie
here being used in the natural sense. In the legal sense, the tie is also
just as close, the proximity of kinship being the same and on the same
level. Too, it is to be doubted whether there is any less degree of aection on the part of an uncle for the child of a brother of a half blood;
yet, while the degree of kinship is the same, the law excludes the half
nephew for the nephew of the whole blood. The law need not be based
on feelings or affection, and the owner of property may display his
affection by making suitable testamentary disposition, but the natural
impulses of men should be reckoned with and given meaning by the law.

This memorandum on the Statute of Descent and Distribution is limited to the three matters set out at the opening. Nothing is said here
about the status of the wife. Perhaps she is not amply provided for
by the statute. Perhaps she should be given a fixed share calculable
in money, to be paid to her as against other takers. Perhaps there should
be provision for support and maintenance for a fixed period. These matters, however, ought not to be considered without regard to her right
of dower, and that is another subject.
Memorandum:
Only one of the members of the committee is of the opinion that
the changes suggested in the comment should be made. Two of the members express no opinion as to the changes suggested in the comment,
but concur in the basic recommendation that there be a reappraisal of
the Statute. One member disapproves outright. The fifth offers no opinion on either aspect.
Respectfully submitted,
COLEMAN KARESH, Chairmn
FRANKIAN G. BuRouGHS
WM. H. GRimBALL, JR.
C. T. HAYNSWORTH, JR.
WM. D. TnxsLY

* The report of the Committee on the Law School was made
by Frank B. Gary, Jr., Chairman. The other members of
this Committee were L. W. Perrin, T. H. Pope, and Calhoun
Thomas.
1. Two and a half years ago this Committee met and determined
that the outstanding need of the Law School was an adequate building.
The present and past officers of this Association, together with many
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others, through the Legislature and University Trustees, have now reduced that determination to a reality. By early Fall the Law School
will be housed in an adequate, modern law school building of which
we will all be proud. Plans for an appropriate dedication program are
now under way.
2. Since our last meeting, acting at the request of the Faculty of
the Law School, the Legislature passed an Act eliminating the privilege
of the Law School graduates to be admitted to the Bar of South Carolina without further examination. This becomes effective July 1, 1950.
It is considered that the elimination of the diploma privilege is consistent
with the best thought in legal educational circles, being recommended
by the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools. There are only seven states in which such a privilege now
survives.
3. Since our last annual meeting, the Association, through its Executive Committee, and the Law School, through its Faculty, with some
assistance from this Committee, have jointly established THE SOUTH
CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY. This is a great step forward both for the
Association and the Law School and deserves our support. Lewis W.
Perrin, Esq., Chairman of our special committee on the law school publication, will make a separate report on this subject.
4. The Faculty of the Law School is being gradually and carefully
enlarged. During the past fifteen months, three new, full-time teachers
have been added: Thomas H. Stubbs, Esq., of Sumter; Cecil E. White,
Esq., of Clinton, and James D. Sumner, Jr., of Spartanburg.
HONORABLE MR. PERRIN:
To Honorable Frank B. Gary, Jr., Chairman of the Law School
Committee:
The sub-committee of the Committee on the Law School begs leave
to report as follows:
Since the last meeting of the South Carolina Bar Association the
SOUTH CAROLiNA LAw QUARTERLY, a joint enterprise of the South Carolina Bar Association and the faculty and students of the University
of South Carolina School of Law, has been successfully launched under
an agreement between the Law School and the Executive Committee
of the South Carolina Bar Association pursuant to the authority granted
by the Association at its last meeting.
The initial issue was published in September, 1948, containing the
record of the transactions of the Forty-fourth Annual Meeting of the
Association. The Secretary of our Association and the Editorial Staff
of the QUARTERLY are to be commended for the satisfactory manner in
which the record of these transactions has been presented. The balance
of this initial issue and the subsequent issues contained articles and
case notes not only of interest but of value to the members of the Bar
of this State and the law students. A number of these articles have
been reviewed in national publications and attention directed to them.
One of the articles from the QUARTERLY has been copied in tote by a
National tax magazine and of another 1,000 copies have been made by
a laymen's organization for distribution among its members.
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A number of copies of issues of the QUARTERLY have been ordered
by parties interested in other jurisdictions, and this includes an order
for one hundred copies of the March issue of the QUARTERLY by U. S.
Circuit Judge Alfred P. Murrah, of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals,
Chairman of the National Judicial Conference, which Judge Murrah
desired for distribution to the members of the United States Circuit
Court Pre-Trial Committees throughout the United States.
The leading articles appearing in the first three issues of the
QUARTERLY are from the pens of Judge L. D. Lide of Marion; (Miss)
James M. Perry of the Greenville Bar; A. L. Hardee, Esq., of the
Florence Bar; Judge M. S. Whaley of the Faculty of the School of
Law; P. F. Henderson, Esq., of the Aiken Bar; Frank K. Sloan, Esq.,
of the Columbia Bar; C. T. Graydon, Esq., of the Columbia Bar;
Douglas McKay, Esq., of the Columbia Bar; Abbott M. Sellers, Esq.,
Washington, D. C. (Attorney in Charge, Compromise Section, Tax
Division, Department of Justice); Hugh C. Howser, Esq., of the
Nashville, Tennessee, Bar; Joseph M. Jones, Esq., of the Washington,
D. C., Bar; John C. Bruton, Esq., of the Columbia Bar (formerly Editor-in-Chief of the PennsyZvania Law Review); William A. Cook of the
Senior class at the Law School, and in addition to these there are
numerous book reviews and case notes written by members of our Bar
and students of the Law School. I am informed that the June issue,
which will complete Volume I of the QUARTERLY, will contain the address of Chief Justice D. Gordon Baker to the January, 1949, graduating class of the Law School, and other appropriate articles of worth.
All students in the Law School and members of the Faculty at
the School are subscribers. There are 113 members of the Association
who are subscribers. There are 78 Law schools and libraries in America
that are subscribers. There are 110 members of the Bar who are not
members of the South Carolina Bar Association who are subscribers.
The Executive Committee of the Association paid into the LAW
QUARTERLY fund $700.00 this year which is just about the cost of publishing its regular transactions and distributing the same among the
members of the Association and those exchanges required by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association.
The total income of the LAW QUARTERLY is about $2800, and the
cost of printing and distribution amounts to about $700 to $750 an
issue, but this does not include other incidental and necessary expenses.
In our opinion the Executive Committee of the Association, the Advisory Committee of the Law Faculty, and the Editorial Staff deserve
the recommendation and thanks of the Association for the fine 'vork
they have done this year, and particularly do we feel grateful to
James D. Sumner, Jr., Esq., recently one of the editors of the Virginia
Law Review, for the fine interest that he is taking in the work of the
LAW QUARTERLY and the Editorial Staff. Mr. Sumner has recently
joined the full-time Faculty of the Law School.
RECOMMENDATIONS

We would recommend:
(1) that all members of the Association become subscribers to the
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY and not only for the reason that the
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QUARTERLY needs the income from this source but because by this
publication we are accumulating a most respectable store of legal
lore in the field of live subjects of interest to the Bar, and those in
command need the encouragement of our interest;
(2) that each member of the Association when called upon to write
for the LAw QUARTERLY make a special effort to arrange his time so
as to comply with such a request; and
(3) that as members of the Bar discover statutory law that in their
opinion needs to be revamped or restated and inconsistencies obviated
and as members of the Bar also observe fields in which the law needs
exploration, they call these to the attention of the Editorial Staff and
thereby perform a distinct service to this enterprise.
These reports were received as information and approved.
Many different plans for the proper support of the LAW
QUARTERLY were advanced and after much discussion and
due consideration Thomas P. Stoney of the Charleston Bar
moved that the dues of the Association be made Twelve and
One-Half ($12.50) Dollars per year and that each member
receive the LAW QUARTERLY as an incident of his membership. This motion was duly carried.
E. Floyd Wilcox moved the adoption of the following resolution:
"WHEREAS, the United States has the highest standards of
health, of medical care, and of scientific medical facilities of any
country in the world, as a result of our system of free enterprise;
and
"WHEREAS, compulsory health insurance, wherever tried, has
caused a decline in national health and deterioration of medical
standards and facilities; and
"WHEREAS, wherever the government has assumed control
of medical services, the result has been tremendous multiplication of costs over original estimates, extreme tax burdens and
national deficits, and gradual extension of socialization into other
activities of national life, NOW, THEREFORE,
"BE IT RESOLVED, That the South Carolina Bar Association
does hereby go on record against any form of compulsory health
insurance or any system of political medicine designed for national
bureaucratic control;
"That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the President
of the United States, to each Senator and Representative from
the State of South Carolina, and that said Senators and Representatives be and are hereby respectfully requested to use every effort at their command to prevent the enactment of such legislation."
After consideration by the Association the motion failed
to pass.
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The Chair then recognized Mr. J. D. E. Meyer, of the
Charleston Bar, as Chairman of the Nomination Committee,
who rendered the report of said Committee as follows:
For President: C. T. Graydon, of the Columbia Bar
For First Vice-President: Frank A. McLeod, of the Sumter Bar
Executive Committeeman: J. Means McFadden, of the Chester
Bar
Secretary and Treasurer: Walter S. Monteith, of the Columbia
Bar
There being no further nominations, the nominations were
closed and the report of the Nominating Committee was
unanimously adopted and these officers were duly elected.
Mr. C. T. Graydon, the newly elected President, was
escorted to the Speakers Rostrum. Mr. Graydon expressed
his appreciation of the honor that had been bestowed upon
him and congratulated the retiring officers and committeemen for the very fine work they had done and pledged his
whole-hearted support toward the work of the Association
for the coming year.
Mr. Frank A. McLeod, the newly-elected First Vice-Pres-.
ident, was escorted to the Rostrum and he also thanked the
Association because of his election and pledged his support
and cooperation toward the work of the Association.
Mr. J. Means McFadden called to the attention of the
Association that he was not eligible to succeed himself on
the Executive Committee, whereupon the Association authorized the new President to appoint someone in his stead. (Subsequently Mr. Graydon has appointed J. Davis Kerr of the
Spartanburg Bar)
The Association then unanimously adopted resolutions expressing to the City of Charleston, the Charleston County
Bar Association, and Mayor J. D. E. Meyer, appreciation for
the delightful courtesies and entertainment offered the Association during its meeting.
After announcements the meeting adjourned.

At 12:45 P.M. the Charleston County Bar Association
entertained the members and their wives at a luncheon at
Hibernian Hall.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss4/3

34

et al.: South Carolina Bar Association Annual Business Meeting
344

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

At 2:00 P.M. the Association was given a boat ride out
to sea upon two navy destroyers.
At 6:00 P.M. the wives of the members of the Charleston
Bar entertained the visiting ladies with a tea at the Villa
Marguerita.
At 8:00 P.M. the members attended the annual banquet.
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